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Lost In a Maze of Character 
Evidence: How the Federal Courts 
Lack a Cohesive Approach to 
Applying Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) in Drug 
Distribution Cases 
 
Brian Byrne1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The admission of a criminal defendant’s prior bad acts can 
be a powerful tool for attaining a conviction. The federal courts 
are currently divided as to whether the defendant’s prior drug 
use is admissible under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence when the defendant is charged with distributing a 
controlled dangerous substance. 
Part I of this Comment will briefly explore the historical 
roots of Rule 404(b). Part II will examine the permissible 
purposes for admitting prior bad acts under Rule 404(b). Part III 
will discuss the circuit split that has developed as to whether the 
defendant’s prior drug use can be admissible under one of the 
exceptions to Rule 404(b) in a prosecution for possession with 
intent to distribute. Part IV examines a new standard for 
analyzing prior drug offenses under Rule 404(b) and argues that 
courts should move away from a mechanical framework of 
applying Rule 404(b). Part V will briefly summarize this 
Comment. 
 
A. History of Excluding Prior Bad Acts 
 
The general rule in American law is that propensity proof 
 
1. B.A., 2012, Seton Hall University; J.D. Candidate, 2016, Pace 
University School of Law. 
1
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should be excluded.2 Rule 404(b) codified this principle in the 
Federal Rule of Evidence.3 Rule 404(b)(1) states in relevant part 
that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible 
to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 
character.”4 However, evidence of character may be admissible 
to prove the defendant’s “motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or 
lack of accident.”5  Rule 404(b) establishes a general rule that an 
individual’s character cannot be established through evidence of 
his prior acts, unless those prior acts relate to a permissible 
purpose. 
The United States Supreme Court has delineated a four-
step framework for the admission of 404(b) evidence.6 First, the 
evidence must be offered for a non-propensity purpose.7  Second, 
the evidence must be relevant pursuant to Rule 402.8  Third, the 
trial court must weigh the probative value of the evidence 
against the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403.9 
Fourth, the trial court must instruct the jury that the evidence 
can only be considered for the specific purpose for which it was 
admitted.10 This framework merely ensures that evidence is 
probative to something other than propensity, and that the 
evidence is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.11 
While Rule 404(b) was uncontroversial when Congress 
passed the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, its proper 
application has engendered a significant amount of 
controversy.12 Identifying whether the prior conviction is 
 
2. See generally People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901). 
3. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). 
4. Id. 
5. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
6. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (finding that 
evidence of the prior act should be admitted if there is “sufficient evidence to 
support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar act.”). 
7. Id. at 691. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 691-92. 
11. See United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2013).  See also 
FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing the exclusion of evidence if the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger for unfair prejudice). 
12. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note (finding that “Rule 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/7
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relevant to some issue other than the defendant’s propensity has 
proven difficult at the trial and appellate levels.13 
 
B. Propensity Proof is Relevant 
 
Rule 404(b)(2) establishes that a defendant’s prior bad acts 
must be relevant to something other than proving character.  
Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as having “any tendency to 
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence; and the fact is of consequence to the determination of 
the action.”14 In essence, Rule 401 requires the evidence to be 
material and probative. First, the evidence is material if it goes 
to the “determination of the action.” Second, the evidence is 
probative if it makes a “fact more or less probable without the 
evidence.” However, relevance is a necessary, not a sufficient 
condition of admissibility.15 
Rule 404(b) is designed to protect the defendant from being 
found guilty based on the inference of bad character.  There is a 
fear that the defendant’s prior bad acts will weigh too heavily 
“with the jury . . . and deny him [the defendant] a fair 
opportunity to defend against a particular charge.”16 While 
evidence of an individual’s character may be relevant, there is 
also the risk that the evidence will be unfairly prejudicial.17 
The party seeking admission of a prior bad must show that 
 
404(b) has emerged as one of the most cited Rules in the Rules of Evidence.”).  
See also Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The 
Trouble with Rule 404(b), 78 TEMP.  L. REV. 201, 209 (2001) (noting that Rule 
404(b) was one of the least controversial rules during the passage of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence). 
13. See Reed, supra note 11. 
14. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
15. See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
16. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948) (alterations 
added). 
17. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (finding that 
while propensity proof is relevant “‘the risk that a jury will convict for crimes 
other than those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway 
because a bad person deserves punishment—creates a prejudicial effect that 
outweighs ordinary relevance.’” (quoting United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 
63 (1st Cir. 1982) (Breyer, J.) (alterations in original)).  See also David Culberg, 
The Accused's Bad Character: Theory and Practice, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1343, 1351 (2009) (noting that it is obvious that propensity proof is relevant). 
3
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it is admissible for a non-propensity purpose.18 Rule 404(b) is 
designed to prevent the prosecution from being able to infer to 
the jury that the defendant is a person of bad character.  
However, even when admitted for a non-propensity purpose 
under Rule 404(b), it is highly debatable whether the current 
rule eliminates the risk that the jury will take the evidence as 
propensity proof. For instance, Rule 404(b) could allow a prior 
act to be admitted to show the defendant’s motive to commit the 
crime if it was not propensity proof. However, in reality, the jury 
is still being informed of the defendant’s prior act and could use 
the evidence as propensity proof.19 
 
C. People v. Molineux20  
 
Decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1901, People 
v. Molineux is considered one of the premier cases that dealt 
with the exclusion of bad acts prior to the adoption of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.21 In Molineux, the defendant was charged 
with the murder of Katherine Adams.22 The undisputed facts of 
the case were that Harry Cornish received a package  in the mail 
containing a substance that he believed was “bromo seltzer.”23 
When his landlady, Katherine Adams, became ill, Cornish 
administered the substance to her, believing it was medicine.24 
Adams died after being administered the substance.25 Shortly 
after, it was revealed that the contents of the bottle contained a 
deadly poison.26  The prosecution theorized that the defendant, 
Molineux, had mailed the poison to Cornish with the intention 
of killing him.27 The alleged motive was that Molineux and 
 
18. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). 
19. See generally Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule 
Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1547, 1555 (1998) (arguing that the distinction 
between non-character use of 404(b) and a propensity inference exists in 
“principal only”). 
20. People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901). 
21. See Reed, supra note 11, at 201. 
22. Molineux, 61 N.E. at 286-87. 
23. Id. at 287. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 288. 
27. Id. at 289. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/7
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Cornish had developed a bitter rivalry over a woman that they 
were both interested in.28 
At Molineux’s trial for the death of Adams, the prosecution 
was allowed to introduce evidence concerning the death of Henry 
A. Barnet.29 Barnett had died a few months before Adams after 
consuming a substance that he received through the mail.30  It 
was later established that Barnett and Adams had both died as 
a result of being poisoned by cyanide of mercury.31 In essence, 
the government was contending that Molineux had killed 
Barnett as well.  On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals 
analyzed the admissibility of the other acts evidence that was 
presented against Molineux. The Court found that evidence of a 
prior bad act can be admissible when it tends to show motive, 
intent, absence of mistake, common scheme or plan, or the 
identity of the perpetrator.32 
After examining these different exceptions, the court found 
that the evidence of Barnett’s death should have been 
excluded.33 The court rejected the prosecution’s theory that the 
similarity of the two killings established that Molineux killed 
Adams.34  Despite evidence of Molineux’s training as a chemist, 
the court found that he was not the only person who possessed 
the “knowledge, skill, and material to produce the poison which 
was sent to Cornish.”35 Molineux now stands for the principle 
that a prior bad act cannot be admitted without meeting specific 
non-character purposes. The purposes mentioned by the 
Molineux Court have become the framework of Rule 404(b). 
 
 
 
II. Proper Purposes for Admission of Prior Bad Acts 
 
Rule 404(b)(1) makes it clear that propensity proof is 
 
28. Id. at 290. 
29. Id. at 289, 293. 
30. Id. at 301. 
31. Id. at 315-16. 
32. Id. at 294. 
33. Id. at 309-10. 
34. Id. at 303. 
35. Id. 
5
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inadmissible.36 However, 404(b)(2) lists a number of proper uses 
for the prior bad act.37 The purposes in 404(b)(2) do not establish 
exceptions to Rule 404(b)’s prohibition on propensity proof. 
Rather they demonstrate non-propensity uses of the prior act 
evidence.38 
 
A. Motive 
 
A prior bad act can be admitted to prove the defendant’s 
motive for committing the crime.39 United States v. 
Cunningham40 is illustrative of how a prior bad act can be 
properly admitted to show the defendant’s motive. Cunningham, 
a nurse, was convicted of tampering with a consumer product by 
allegedly removing Demerol from syringes and replacing it with 
a saline solution.41 After it was discovered that Cunningham had 
a previous addiction to Demerol, she agreed to a blood and urine 
test to detect for Demerol.42 After testing revealed that 
Cunningham had recently used Demerol, she was arrested for 
the theft.43 
The district court admitted evidence that Cunningham had 
previously had her license suspended due to her theft of Demerol 
at another hospital.44 Following her conviction, Cunningham 
challenged the admission of this evidence on appeal. The 
Seventh Circuit found that evidence of Cunningham’s 
suspension did not show a propensity to steal, but showed her 
motive to continue feeding her Demerol addiction.45 In other 
words, the admission of Cunningham’s suspension was not 
propensity proof, but established her motive to commit the 
 
36. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).  However, this rule is not without 
exceptions.  See FED. R. EVID. 412-415 (allowing propensity proof when the 
defendant is accused of certain sex offenses). 
37. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
38. See United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 855 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014) (en 
banc). 
39. See FED.  R. EVID.  404(b). 
40. United States v. Cunningham, 103 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1996). 
41. Id. at 555. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 556. 
45. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/7
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crime. 
 
B. Knowledge 
 
A prior act can also be admissible to show the defendant’s 
knowledge in the current crime. In United States v. Vargas,46 the 
defendant was arrested after DEA agents found 282 kilograms 
of cocaine in a secret compartment of a produce trailer he was 
driving.47 Vargas claimed that he did not know the cocaine was 
there and he was only aware of the lawful items in the trailer. 
At trial, the government sought to introduce evidence of previous 
instances in which Vargas had transported drugs in refrigerated 
trailers similar to the vehicle he was driving in the present 
case.48 The district court admitted the evidence of the other acts, 
finding that they were relevant to the defendant “knowingly” 
transporting cocaine.49 
Upon his conviction, Vargas challenged the admission of the 
other acts evidence as a violation of Rule 404(b). However, the 
Seventh Circuit found that Vargas’ prior acts of transporting 
drugs in similar refrigerated vehicles were relevant to his 
knowledge that he was transporting drugs in the present case.50  
Since Vargas was claiming that he had no knowledge of the 
cocaine’s presence, his prior acts of transporting cocaine in 
similar circumstances were probative of his knowledge in the 
present case. As such, the prosecution could argue that the prior 
acts made it more likely that Vargas was aware of the cocaine’s 
presence. However, the prosecution could not argue that the 
evidence showed a propensity to transport drugs. 51 
 
C. Identity 
 
A prior bad act can also be admitted when it is probative of 
the defendant’s identity. Identity is an exception to 404(b) when 
 
46. United States v. Vargas, 552 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2008). 
47. Id. at 552. 
48. Id. at 553. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. It is certainly debatable whether an ordinary juror would be able to 
make such a fine distinction. 
7
  
2016 LOST IN A MAZE OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE 631 
the prior act and the present charge share a similarity that 
“earmarks the behavior as that of the same person.”52  In other 
words, the acts are so distinctive that it can be fairly inferred 
that the same person committed them. 
In United States v. Shumway,53 the defendant, an 
archeologist, was convicted of charges stemming from 
unauthorized excavations at a site in Canyonlands National 
Park.54 Shumway claimed that he was not responsible for the 
excavations that occurred.55 To establish Shumway’s identity, 
the government moved to admit evidence of Shumway’s prior 
activities at the same site a number of years earlier.56 
The district court admitted the evidence of Shumway’s prior 
activities as relevant to proving his identity under Rule 404(b).57 
On appeal, Shumway argued that his prior archeological 
activities at the site lacked the distinctiveness to be admissible 
under the identity exception to Rule 404(b).58  The Tenth Circuit 
found that the prior acts were relevant to Shumway’s identity in 
two respects.59  First, both acts occurred at the same site, and 
the unique geographical location made the acts “distinctive.”60 
Second, the court found that the acts required specialized 
knowledge, also making them distinctive.61  As a result, the 
evidence was relevant under Rule 404(b) as proof of Shumway’s 
identity.62  The evidence was admissible since Shumway’s 
identity was in dispute, and the evidence was relevant towards 
proving that he committed the excavations. 
 
III. The Circuit Split 
 
52. See also Allen v. State, 720 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind. 1999) (finding that 
the rationale of the exception is that “the crimes, or means used to commit 
them, were so similar and unique that it is highly probable that the same 
person committed all of them.”). 
53. United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413 (10th Cir. 1997). 
54. Id. at 1417. 
55. Id. at 1418. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1418. 
58. Id. at 1419. 
59. Id. at 1420. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 1421. 
62. Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/7
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A. Circuits That Have Excluded Prior Drug Use When the 
Defendant Is Charged With Distribution of a Controlled 
Dangerous Substance 
 
The federal courts of appeals are currently divided as to 
whether a prior conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance can be admissible in a later prosecution for possession 
with the intent to distribute. 
In United States v. Davis,63 the Third Circuit addressed the 
issue of whether a prior possession conviction was admissible 
under Rule 404(b) in a prosecution for possession with the intent 
to distribute.64 In Davis, Philadelphia police observed the 
defendant, Davis, and a companion seated in a car and engaged 
in what appeared to be a drug deal.65 As the police approached 
the car, the two men quickly exited and began to walk away. The 
police conducted a Terry66 stop of the two individuals and 
discovered that Davis and his companion were carrying large 
amounts of cash.67 Inside the car, the police found 740 grams of 
cocaine. Davis was charged with possessing a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a) (1).68 
Prior to trial, the government sought to introduce Davis’ 
2007 conviction for possession of cocaine.69 The government 
contended that the prior conviction was not being offered to 
prove Davis’ character, but was relevant to his “plan to, 
knowledge of, and intent to distribute and/or possess cocaine, 
and absence of mistake or accident.”70 Davis argued that the 
evidence of his prior conviction was only being offered to show 
his propensity to commit drug offenses.71 
 
63. United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434 (3d Cir. 2013). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 437-38. 
66. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
67. Davis, 726 F.3d at 437-38. 
68. Id. 
69. See United States v. Davis, No. 11-227, 2011 WL 5339280, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. Nov. 7, 2011). 
70. Id. at *3. 
71. Id. 
9
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The district court admitted the evidence, finding that Davis’ 
prior cocaine conviction was relevant to his knowledge of what 
cocaine looked like.72 Additionally, the court found that Davis’ 
prior possession of cocaine made it less plausible that he was 
only a passenger inside the car.73  The district court also 
concluded that Davis’ prior conviction was not unduly 
prejudicial under Rule 403.74 
Following his conviction, Davis contended on appeal that 
the the admission of his prior possession conviction violated Rule 
404(b).75  The government argued that the prior conviction was 
admissible to show Davis’ knowledge of the cocaine and his 
intent to distribute it.76 
The Third Circuit found that the prior possession conviction 
was not admissible to prove Davis’ knowledge of the cocaine in 
the car.77 First, the court surmised that cocaine could look 
differently when packaged for distribution.  Moreover, the court 
pointed out that there are different forms of cocaine, and it was 
not established which form of cocaine Davis had previously 
possessed and whether the drugs found in the car were the 
same.78 Due to these differences, the court concluded that the 
prior cocaine possession was not relevant to prove Davis’ 
knowledge in this case.79 Moreover, the court found that the 
prior conviction’s weak probative value was outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.80 
Secondly, the court found the prior conviction inadmissible 
to prove Davis’ intent to distribute the cocaine.81 The court 
focused on the difference between possessing a drug for personal 
use and distributing it commercially.82 Examining this 
distinction, the Third Circuit refused to accept the logic that 
prior drug use implied an intent to distribute drugs at a later 
 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at *4. 
74. Id. at *5. 
75. Davis, 726 F.3d at 440. 
76. Id. at 442. 
77. Id. at 443. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 444. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/7
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date.83  While acknowledging a circuit split on this issue, the 
court found that Davis’ prior conviction lacked probative value 
and should have been excluded.84 
A few days before the Third Circuit issued its ruling in 
Davis, the Seventh Circuit decided the same issue in United 
States v. Lee.85 Defendant Eddie Lee was charged with 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and conspiracy to 
commit the same offense.86 Included in the indictment were 
Lee’s alleged co-conspirators, Darin Hurt, Anthony Clardy, and 
Christopher Holcolmb.87  It was the government’s theory that 
Lee was Hurt’s cocaine supplier.88 
In December 2009, Lee was pulled over on the interstate due 
to an expired registration on the car he was driving.89  Lee 
explained to the police that the car belonged to his 
goddaughter.90 After a drug-detection dog detected the presence 
of narcotics, the officers conducted a search of the car but did not 
find any drugs.91 Following the search, the police impounded the 
car due to an expired registration.92 
Later that day, Lee was in the car with Darin Hurt when 
the police stopped the car as part of a narcotics investigation.93  
After an officer searched the car for drugs, Lee informed the 
police that his car had been impounded earlier that day.94 Later 
that day, Drug Enforcement Agents went to the tow yard and 
led a narcotics dog around Lee’s car.95 After the canine signaled 
 
83. Id. The court found that possession of a drug for personal use is far 
different than distributing it commercially.  See United States v. Ono, 918 F.2d 
1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that “[a]cts related to the personal use of a 
controlled substance are of a wholly different order than acts involving the 
distribution of a controlled substance.”). 
84. Davis, 726 F.3d at 445. 
85. United States v. Lee, 724 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2013). 
86. Id. at 970. 
87. Id.  Of these defendants only Lee would end up going to trial. 
88. Id. at 970-71. 
89. Id. at 972.  The stop of Lee’s car was not related to the investigation 
of Lee’s drug distribution activity. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 972. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 973. 
11
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positively at the car, the agents received a warrant to search the 
vehicle.96 The agents subsequently discovered 210 grams of 
cocaine in a bag behind the spare tire in Lee’s trunk.97  At trial, 
Lee did not call any witnesses.  Lee’s defense was that the car 
was not his and he was unaware of the cocaine’s presence in the 
trunk.98 Lee’s first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury was 
unable to reach a verdict on the possession or conspiracy 
charge.99 
Prior to Lee’s second trial, the government sought to 
introduce Lee’s 2004 conviction for possession of cocaine.100  The 
government argued that Lee’s prior conviction “helped prove 
that Lee was not an innocent bystander who was framed by 
malevolent police officers. He was an experienced cocaine dealer 
who was stopped while making a fifth delivery of drugs to his 
‘co-conspirator.’”101 Without explanation, the district court 
admitted Lee’s 2004 conviction.102 Having been presented with 
Lee’s prior conviction and other relevant evidence, the jury 
convicted Lee on both the possession and conspiracy charge.103 
On appeal, Lee argued that the district court had abused its 
discretion in admitting his 2004 possession conviction.104  
Agreeing with Lee, the Seventh Circuit reversed his 
conviction.105  The court found that in order for a prior act to be 
admissible under 404(b), the district court must closely analyze 
 
96. Id. 
97. Id.  There was an eight-hour gap between the original search of Lee’s 
car and the second search at the tow yard. 
98. Id.  Lee also pointed out that the eight-hour gap between the two 
searches, although Lee’s attorney denied that the defense was asserting that 
the drugs had been planted.  Id. at 974. 
99. Id. at 973. 
100. Id.  Lee’s 2004 conviction was for possession of more than 15 but less 
than 100 grams of cocaine.  Id. 
101. Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 20, United States v. Lee, 724 F.3d 
968 (2013)(No. 12-1718), 2013 WL 1208774 at *20. In essence, the government 
was arguing that Lee’s prior conviction was relevant because of his claim to be 
an innocent bystander.  There appeared to be precedent within the Seventh 
Circuit to support this argument.  See United States v. Chavis, 429 F.3d 662, 
668 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that defendant’s prior drug conviction was relevant 
to prove his intent when he claimed to be a “clueless bystander.”). 
102. Lee, 724 F.3d at 974. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 975. 
105. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/7
  
636 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:2 
the “specific matter that the evidence is being offered to 
establish.”106 In other words, where the government claims that 
the prior bad act is being offered to show intent, the district court 
must analyze the extent to which the defendant’s intent is at 
issue.107 
The court was especially critical of the government’s theory 
that Lee’s five-year-old possession conviction was relevant to his 
intent to distribute cocaine in 2009.108 While acknowledging that 
the government had the obligation of proving Lee’s intent, this 
did not automatically equate to the admission of Lee’s prior acts 
to show his intent.109 Finding that Lee’s intent or knowledge was 
not in genuine dispute, the court held that the prior conviction 
was propensity evidence that must be excluded under Rule 
404(b).110 
Moreover, Lee’s innocent bystander defense did not bring 
his intent or knowledge into dispute.111  Lee did not claim that 
the quantity of drugs found in the vehicle was not intended for 
distribution, nor did he claim that he had no knowledge of 
cocaine.112  The court also rejected the government’s contention 
that the conviction was admissible to prove absence of mistake.  
Lee was not claiming that he had unknowingly placed the drugs 
in the car; he was asserting that the drugs did not belong to 
him.113  As a result, the prior conviction was not probative 
towards proving the absence of any mistake on Lee’s part. 
Similar to the Seventh, the Sixth Circuit has also excluded 
a prior possession conviction in a prosecution for possession with 
intent to distribute.114  In United States v. Haywood,115 the 
defendant was prosecuted for possession with intent to 
distribute arising out of a sale to a government informant.116  At 
trial, the government sought to introduce evidence that 
 
106. Id. at 976. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 979. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 980-81. 
111. Id. at 980. 
112. Id. at 978. 
113. Id. at 979. 
114. United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2002). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 717. 
13
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Haywood had also been arrested for possession of cocaine within 
a few months of his sale to the informant.117 The district court 
admitted the arrest for straight possession, finding that it was 
probative of Haywood’s intent to distribute the cocaine in the 
current case.118 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that the district court 
had abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Haywood’s 
arrest for straight possession of cocaine.119 While acknowledging 
that Haywood’s intent to distribute the cocaine was at issue in 
the case, the court determined that the possession conviction 
was not sufficiently probative of Haywood’s intent.120  The court 
found that there was a lack of similarity between possessing a 
small amount of cocaine for personal use and distributing it 
commercially.121 Due to the different quantities between the two 
acts, the court found that the possession conviction was 
irrelevant to proving Haywood’s intent to distribute.122  
Moreover, the court found that even if Haywood’s possession was 
probative of his intent to distribute, its admission was 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.123 
Haywood’s dissenting opinion criticized the majority for 
failing to see the relevance of Haywood’s prior possession of 
cocaine and its probative value on his intent to distribute.124  The 
dissent found it especially relevant that both acts involved the 
use of cocaine.125  Carrying a certain drug on a number of 
occasions supports the inference that the defendant intents to 
distribute that drug at a later time.126  Moreover, the dissent 
argued the defendant’s prior possession of cocaine was probative 
of his knowledge that he was distributing cocaine in the present 
matter.127 
While Lee, Davis, and Haywood should not be interpreted as 
 
117. Id. at 720. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 721. 
120. Id. at 722-23. 
121. Id. at 721-22. 
122. Id. at 722. 
123. Id. at 723. 
124. Id. at 726 (Gibson, J., dissenting). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 727 (Gibson, J., dissenting). 
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adopting per se rules of exclusion, these decisions created a high 
standard of admissibility for a prior drug possession conviction 
when the defendant is charged with possession with intent to 
distribute. These decisions recognize that the relevance of a 
prior conviction for straight possession only has marginal 
relevance towards proving the defendant’s intent to distribute, 
or knowledge of a controlled dangerous substance.  Recognizing 
the highly prejudicial nature of the prior conviction and its 
marginal relevance, these courts have placed a heavy burden on 
the government to show that the prior possession conviction is 
probative of the defendant’s intent or knowledge to distribute in 
the present case. 
 
B. The Opposing View 
 
However, other circuits have taken a far more inclusive 
approach to the admission of prior drug use to prove the 
defendant’s intent or knowledge to distribute a controlled 
dangerous substance. 
In United States v. Gadison,128 the defendant was charged 
with conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.129  
The district court admitted the defendant’s prior state court 
conviction for possession of cocaine, finding that it was probative 
of his intent to distribute in the present case.130  Upon conviction, 
the defendant argued that the admission of his prior cocaine 
convictions violated Rule 404(b). Rejecting  this argument, the 
Fifth Circuit found that the prior conviction was admissible to 
prove the defendant’s intent to distribute the drugs.131 The 
framework used by the Fifth Circuit centered on whether the 
prior conviction was relevant to any issue other than the 
defendant’s character.132 After a very brief analysis, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that the prior cocaine conviction was 
admissible, since it was relevant toward proving the defendant’s 
intent.133 
 
128. United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 1993). 
129. Id. at 191. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 192. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
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The Eight Circuit has also held that prior drug use is 
admissible to show the defendant’s intent to distribute.134  While 
the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the defendant’s prior 
conviction only related to personal drug use, the court concluded 
that it was relevant toward proving the defendant’s intent to 
distribute in the present case.135  Similar to the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit has also repeatedly admitted prior 
drug convictions related to personal use in order to prove the 
defendant’s intent to distribute.136 
 
IV. What is the Proper Standard? 
 
At the heart of Rule 404(b) is the belief that a defendant’s 
propensity to commit a crime is not a valid basis for the 
admission of character evidence.137 While there is broad 
agreement on this principle, it has proven difficult to administer 
where a defendant is charged with possession with intent to 
distribute.138 
The current circuit split on whether a defendant’s prior drug 
possession can be properly admitted to prove the defendant’s 
intent to distribute narcotics reflects a fundamental 
misconception of how Rule 404(b) should be applied. Courts that 
have adopted a broad standard of admissibility have focused on 
the fact that the defendant’s intent is at issue in a drug 
distribution case.139  However, just because the the defendant’s 
intent is formally at issue does not mean that the prior 
conviction is admissible in a non-propensity way. Judge 
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit has noted, that the “list of 
exceptions in Rule 404(b), if mechanically applied, would 
overwhelm the central principle. Almost any bad evidence 
simultaneously condemns by besmirching character and by 
 
134. See United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172 (8th Cir. 1997). 
135. Id. at 1177-78. 
136. See United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1195 (11th Cir. 1997); 
See also United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211, 1226 (11th Cir. 2013). 
137. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). 
138. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012); see also United States v. Monzon, 869 
F.2d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that the defendant’s intent is at issue 
when charged with a specific intent crime). 
139. See generally United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 1993). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/7
  
640 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:2 
showing one or more of ‘motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake . . . .’”140 
One of the main points of confusion regarding the 
application of Rule 404(b) is how to identify whether a prior 
offense is only probative of the defendant’s propensity to commit 
the charged offense. Part of this confusion can be traced to a lack 
of guidance on this issue.141  While courts have frequently 
applied modifications of the four-step framework in 
Huddleston,142 these approaches have failed to closely scrutinize 
whether the prior act is being offered for a non-propensity 
purpose.  In order to faithfully apply Rule 404(b), courts must 
adopt a framework that places a greater emphasis on analyzing 
how the prior act relates to the current offense without 
amounting to propensity proof. This can be accomplished by 
focusing on the core principles of Rule 404(b). 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Approach 
 
A recent en banc ruling from the Seventh Circuit built upon 
other decisions in that Circuit to provide a solid foundation for 
evaluating whether a prior act is admissible under Rule 404(b).  
In United States v. Gomez,143 the Seventh Circuit noted the 
recurring problems with applying Rule 404(b) in the drug 
context, and adopted a “rules-based approach” to determine if 
the prior act relates to anything other than the defendant’s 
propensity to commit the charged offense.144 
The Seventh Circuit first noted that it had previously 
applied a four-part test to determine the admissibility of prior 
acts evidence under Rule 404(b).145  Finding that this test had 
 
140. United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(alterations and emphasis in original). 
141. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note (stating that “no 
mechanical solution is offered”). 
142. See United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681 (1988). 
143. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 852. The four-part test called for the court to evaluate whether: 
1) the prior act is relevant to something other than the defendant’s propensity; 
2) the act must be similar to the current charge and close in time; 3) the 
evidence must be sufficient to establish that the prior act occurred; and 4) the 
probative value of the prior act cannot be substantially outweighed by the 
17
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“ceased to be useful,” the court determined that a “rules-based 
framework” would more effectively serve the purpose of Rule 
404(b) in preventing the admission of propensity proof.146 
Briefly stated, Nicolas Gomez was charged with conspiracy 
to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.147 Gomez’s alleged 
involvement in the conspiracy stemmed from a federal 
investigation of Robert Romero, a known Chicago cocaine 
dealer.148 After federal agents wiretapped Romero’s phone, they 
intercepted a number of conversations between Romero, and a 
reseller in Milwaukee, known as “Guerro.”149  The agents were 
able to trace these phone calls to Gomez’s residence in 
Milwaukee.150 
Four weeks after Gomez met with Romero in Milwaukee, 
Gomez was arrested under the theory that he was “Guerro.”151  
After Gomez’s home was searched, federal agents found a small 
quantity of cocaine in the bedroom.152  At trial, the district court 
admitted the cocaine found in Gomez’s bedroom, finding that it 
was relevant to prove that Gomez was “Guerro.”153  After being 
convicted, Gomez appealed on the grounds that the admission of 
the cocaine found in his bedroom was a violation of Rule 
404(b).154 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the multi-prong test 
it had previously used.155  Rather, the focus must be on the 
“chain of reasoning” of why the evidence is being offered for a 
non-propensity purpose.156 In essence, the court must examine 
“how exactly the evidence is relevant to that purpose . . . .”157 
The second step in the Seventh Circuit’s approach is to 
examine whether, even if the other act evidence is relevant 
 
danger of unfair prejudice. 
146. Id. at 853. 
147. Id. at 851. 
148. Id. at 850. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 851. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 852. 
154. Id. 
155. See id. at 854. 
156. See id. at 856. 
157. See id. (emphasis in original). 
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without relying on propensity, it is unfairly prejudicial under 
Rule 403’s balancing test.158 As such, even if the prior act 
evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), the court must still 
weigh the probative value of the evidence against the danger of 
unfair prejudice.159 
Applying this rule to the facts of Gomez, the court found that 
the cocaine in Gomez’s bedroom was propensity proof.160  The 
court concluded that the prosecution’s argument relied upon the 
premise that because Gomez possessed a small amount of 
cocaine in his home, it was more likely that he was part of the 
cocaine distribution conspiracy.161 Due to this reasoning, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the cocaine in Gomez’s bedroom was 
propensity proof and inadmissible under Rule 404(b).162 
 
B. Advantages of the Seventh Circuit’s Approach 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach in Gomez provides a solid 
foundation for assessing the admissibility of prior acts evidence 
under Rule 404(b).  The Gomez court correctly recognized that 
analyzing a prior act under a multi-prong framework has the 
danger of creating an “artificial checklist.”163 The Gomez court 
appeared to be concerned that district judges were falling into 
the trap of simply identifying a proper basis, such as intent or 
identity under Rule 404(b), without examining whether that 
basis was relevant in a non-propensity way.164 
Despite Rule 404(b)’s prohibition on propensity evidence, 
the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have routinely 
admitted evidence of prior drug use in order to show the 
defendant’s intent to distribute, or knowledge of a controlled 
 
158. See id. See also FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing the court to exclude 
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice). 
159. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 857. 
160. See id. at 861. A majority of the court concluded that the admission 
of the cocaine was harmless error. Id. at 864. However, four judges of the 
Seventh Circuit dissented, finding that the admission of the cocaine was not 
harmless. See generally id. at 865 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
161. Id. at 864. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 853. 
164. Id. 
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dangerous substance.165  The crucial flaw in this analysis is that 
it fails to analyze how the prior drug use is relevant without 
relying on a propensity inference. Rather, their approach of 
automatic inclusion is satisfied when the government shows 
that the prior act is “(1) relevant to a material issue; (2) proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence; (3) higher in probative value 
than in prejudicial effect; and (4) similar in kind and close in 
time to the crime charged.”166  While this approach may be sound 
in theory, it fails to adequately guard against propensity proof. 
As the Gomez court realized, employing a mechanical 
interpretation of Rule 404(b) reduces the court’s analysis to 
simply checking formal boxes on the way to inevitable 
admissibility.167 By failing to analyze how the prior drug use is 
relevant without relying on propensity, these courts are only 
paying lip-service to the requirements of Rule 404(b). 
Applying the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Gomez, it is 
clear that when a defendant is charged with possession with 
intent to distribute, a prior act of straight possession is only 
relevant to show a propensity to commit the charged offense.  
The Third Circuit noted in Davis that there is a substantial 
difference between the two offenses.168  Moreover, the idea that 
straight possession shows the defendant’s intent to distribute 
drugs later relies upon a propensity inference: he is more likely 
to do it again since he did it before.169  The Seventh Circuit’s 
approach guards against this propensity inference by requiring 
the proponent of the evidence to show how the evidence is 
relevant without relying on propensity. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 
165. See Deena Greenberg, Closing Pandora's Box: Limiting the Use of 
404(b) to Introduce Prior Convictions in Drug Prosecutions, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L 
L. REV. 519, 530 (2015) (noting that at least the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have applied a “presumptive approach” for admitting drug convictions 
under Rule 404(b)). 
166. United States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1178 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting 
United States v. Campbell, 937 F.2d 404, 408 (8th Cir. 1998)). 
167. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 854. 
168. See Davis, 726 F.3d 434 at 444. 
169. See Lee, 724 F.3d at 979 (noting that Lee’s prior possession did not 
show his intent to distribute). 
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Rule 404(b) makes it clear that a defendant’s prior acts 
cannot be used to show propensity to commit the charged 
offense. However, courts have had difficulty identifying 
propensity proof. To solve this problem, courts must look to the 
fundamental purpose behind Rule 404(b): to exclude evidence 
that is only relevant to prove the defendant’s character. The 
Seventh Circuit’s approach provides the most stable foundation 
for excluding propensity proof by forcing the proponent to 
identify how the evidence is relevant without relying on a 
propensity inference. 
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